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Abstract
Introduction
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are prone to most security attacks. 
These attacks are such as wormhole attack, sinkhole attack, selective 
forwarding attack, and Sybil attack. So, each layers in WSNs has 
some security attacks. Sensor nodes are easily susceptible to security 
attacks, since deployed these nodes are unattended and unprotected. 
Also, limited capacity of sensor nodes accounts for the security 
attacks on WSNs. Applications such as military surveillance, traffic 
surveillance, healthcare, and environmental monitoring are impacted 
by security attacks. Hence, researchers have created various types of 
detection approaches against such attacks. Selective forwarding attack 
is one of an attack that is not easily detected in the networks layer. In 
selective forwarding attack, malicious nodes function in the same way 
as other nodes in the networks. However, it attempts to delete or 
modify the sensitive information prior to transferring the packet to 
other node. In this poster, we proposed an approach for monitoring 
this type attack in wireless sensor networks.
Sensor nodes use communication to transfer packets from the source 
to base station by using multi-hop. In selective forwarding attack, 
malicious nodes have attempted to stop the packets in a network by 
rejecting message forwarding. It is not easy to detect this type of 
attack due to unreliable communications. Selective forwarding attacks 
can be impacted to some routing protocols [1]. It compromised node 
has notable consequences. Based on researchers, limited power and 
low memory are obstacles that make conventional security measures 
inappropriate for WSNs [2]. A compromised node selectively drops 
packets. Malicious nodes work in the same manner such as other 
nodes in the network field. However, these malicious nodes attempt to 
find sensitive messages and drop them before sending the entire 
packets to the next nodes. The attackers make sensor network rely on 
the redundancy forwarding by using broadcast for data to spread in 
network. They compromise internal sensor nodes then launch attacks, 
which it is hard to detect. Also, attackers can refuse to forward the 
messages to other nodes or drop sensitive information. The majority 
of WSN protocols do not have the security to prevent simple attacks 
on the nodes [3]. 
Sensor node has limited communication and computational resources. It 
has short radio range and it is simply compromised by an attackers. As a 
result, in Figure 1, node A sent some packages (P1, P2, P3, and P4) to 
node B using the route that is between the two nodes. The attacker breaks 
the link between nodes and steals two packets (P1 and P3), keep the other 
packets (P2 and P4) transferred to the base station.
In Figure 2, there are two sensor nodes A and B transfer some packets to 
node C. node A send (P2 and P4) and node B send (P1 and P3). The 
attacker who breaks the link between nodes drop the two packets that 
sent from node A so the entire packet is not transferred to the base 
station. However, the other two packets that sent from node B were 
transferred to node C.
Proposed System
Figure 1. Selective forwarding attack
Figure 2. Selective forwarding attack
We designed three layers including MAC pool IDs layer, rule-based 
processing layer, and anomaly detection layer as shown in Figure 3. 
They maintain the safety of data transmission between a source node 
and base station while detecting selective forwarding attacks. 
Furthermore. We demonstrate the performance of the protocol by 
creating a military base scenario. There are some assumptions to detect 
the selective forwarding attack within certain applications. We assume 
that all nodes are the same specification. All nodes in the network are 
having the same energy at starting point and having maximum energy. 
All nodes can send data to Base station. 
Figure 3. Selective Forwarding Detection-Multi-Layers
Algorithm 1. MAC Pool of IDs Layer
1. Input = (MP: Mac Pool)
2. Network parameter = (SN: sensor node, RT: route, TSN: Total sensor node)
3. For (SN = 0; SN <= TSN; SN++)
4. Set SN = SN + 1
5. If SN ∈MP then
6. Set SN = 0 // the node is declared as malicious node not allowed for communication.
7. Rejected
8. Dropped
9. Else if SN = 1 // Node is declared as a legitimate node and allowed for communication
10. Accept
11. Store
12. Set SN = RT
13. SN → RP
14. End if 
15. End else
16. End for
The first layer consists of a pool of MAC IDs that filter and match the 
traffic. Each traffic packet is monitored. The packet is matched to 
identify malicious activity using message fields (e.g., the packet, 
destination, and source IDs). It checks whether a node is legitimate or 
malicious. Therefore, if a node is assigned a value of zero, it drops a 
packet and is considered malicious. Otherwise, it is accepted as a 
legitimate node and send it to the second layer, which is rule processing 
layer. In our study, we analyze the malicious nodes that are detected in 
the first step using an algorithm based on the pool of MAC IDs as shown 
in Algorithm 1
MAC Pool ID Layer
The second layer involves rule-based processing. It is the middle layer. It 
detects known attacks using rules. These are techniques used to define 
and describe the normal operations for detecting selective forwarding 
attacks. Rules must be applied before nodes are deployed in a network 
area. The rule-based processing layer checks the traffic by comparing it 
to a list of rules. If the traffic satisfies at least 90% of the rules, the node 
is confirmed to be legitimate as shown in Algorithm 2. Therefore, the 
traffic will be accepted and send it to the third layer, which is anomaly 
detection layer. If the traffic does not satisfy 90% of the rules, the node is 
considered doubtful and is rejected.
Rule Processing Layer
Algorithm 2. Rules Processing Layer
1. Input = (RP: Rules Process)
2. Output = (DT: Selective Forwarding Detector, RU: Rules)
3. Network parameter = (SN: Sensor node, RT: Route)
4. Attacking parameter = (SFAT: Attacker)
5. RL1 = Rules based in IDS (RL1IDS)
6. RP ⊆ RL1IDS
7. Set RL1 >= RU // 90% from the rules
8. For (SFAT = RL1; SFAT <= RP; SFAT ++)
9. If SFAT ⊆ RP then
10. DT → SFAT
11. Attack alert
12. Rejected
13. Dropped
14. Else if (SFAT ⊄ RP) then
15. Set SN = RT
16. SN → AD
17. End if
18. End else
19. End for
MAC Pool ID Layer
The third layer involves anomaly detection, which is the recognition of 
unknown attacks. This layer checks the traffic that comes from the rule-
based processing layer. Therefore, it works to analyze the traffic. The 
possible results of anomaly detection are false negative, false positive, 
true negative, and true positive. If the algorithm determines that an 
unknown attack, which is a false negative, it sends an alert that is a 
malicious node thus it dropped. Otherwise, the traffic is returned to the 
pool of MAC IDs by confirming the legitimacy of the node as shown in 
Algorithm 3.
Algorithm 3. Anomaly Detection Layer Based on IDS
1. Input = (AD: Anomaly Detection)
2. Output = (DT: Selective Forwarding Detector)
3. Network parameter = (SN: Sensor node, RT: Route)
4. Attacking parameter = (SFAT: Attacker)
5. RL2 = Anomaly detection based in IDS (RL2IDS)
6. AD ⊆ RL2IDS
7. For (RL2 = 0; RL2 <= AD; RL2 ++)
8. RL2 = RL2 + 1
9. If RL2 ∈ AD then
10. Compute FN
11. FN = 1/N ∑ FN
12. M = 1
13. Set Alert
14. Rejected
15. Dropped
16. Else if RL2 ∉ AD then
17. No Attack
18. Set SN = RT
19. Return
20. SN →MP
21. Declared
22. End if
23. End else
24. End for
The goal of this model is to extend the network life time while maintaining 
the Quality of Service (QoS). The network lifetime is very important 
metrics of wireless sensor networks. The model also aims to make a 
balance for the energy utilization therefore, provide longer secure 
surveillance for the military application.
System Model
Reliability
Figure 4. Reliable Detection Rate of SFD Approach
Energy efficiency
Figure 5. Energy Efficiency of SFD Approach
Scalability
Figure 6. Scalability Ratio of SFD Approach
Results and Discussion
SFD approach is estimated through the simulation. We have pointed on 
reliable detection rate, energy consumption, and scalability ratio. In the 
simulation, 200 sensor nodes are deployed in an area network size 800 * 
800 square meters. Hence, each node has a 35 meters transmission range 
and sensing range of node is 30 meters. Consequently, the communication 
overheads are decreased.
Figures 4, 5, and 6 describe the reliable detection rate, energy 
consumption, and scalability ratio of our approach. We proved our 
approach with 50% malicious nodes and static nodes. It clearly shows that 
SFD is stable at almost the same level when the time increased from 0 min 
to 27 min. Therefore, the new approach is successfully detect the malicious 
node.
Conclusion
Selective forwarding detection and monitoring objectives are to detect 
malicious nodes, extend the network’s life time, maintaining the Quality 
of Service (QoS) based on the three factors which are reliability, energy 
efficiency, and scalability. The new approach contains of three layers 
including MAC pool IDs layer, rule-based processing layer, and anomaly 
detection layer. Selective forwarding detection maintains the safety of 
data transmission between the source and base station. Also, it improves 
the performance of attack detection such as in a military application. In 
addition, the approach is demonstrated using Network Simulation (NS2). 
The network’s lifetime is most significant metrics of wireless sensor 
networks. So, we improved reliability detection, reduced the energy 
consumptions and developed scalability ratio. 
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